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Abstract (150 words) 
The European External Action Service (EEAS) and its EU delegations have developed the notion of 
‘being of service to EU member states’ in EU foreign policy making as their unique selling point for the 
past eight years. In this paper, we discuss how the EEAS and its delegation network sought to establish 
throughput legitimacy and why being considered legitimate is a particular concern for them. We trace 
the conflicting expectations of ‘roles’ expressed during the Convention on the Future of Europe and the 
Lisbon Treaty and show how the EEAS and EU delegations responded to treaty implementation. 
Because the EEAS and EU delegations were treated as separate parts during the discussions of the time, 
we are able to compare how different levels of role contestation lead to different strategies for legitimacy 
construction in practice.  
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“With its 5 000-strong staff, the EEAS will never be in a position to fully replace the approximately 
60.000 diplomats that the Member States have posted around the world, but the EEAS must 
increasingly become the hub of collective European diplomacy – if it is to be taken seriously by the 
rest of the world in serious issues.”  - Farewell Speech by Foreign Minister Carl Bildt at the 
Swedish Institute of International Affairs, Stockholm, 29 September 2014 
The Lisbon Treaty (2009) aimed at making EU foreign policy-making more coherent, more efficient 
and more unitary. As most European foreign policy upgrades in the past, the focus has been put on 
institutional and procedural adaptations in Brussels, with the creation of the European External Action 
Service (EEAS) and the re-positioning of the High Representative (HR) as chair of the Foreign Affairs 
Council and Vice-president of the Commission. The Lisbon Treaty innovations also strengthened 
European cooperation in third countries by upgrading former European Commission delegations to 
comprehensive EU delegations and strengthening European diplomatic cooperation abroad (Maurer & 
Bicchi 2018, Edwards 2014).  With enough time passed to allow changes to take effect since 2009 
(Duke 2009; Missiroli 2010; Vanhoonacker & Pomorska 2013), it is now high time to take a step back 
and try to grasp the nature of those institutional adaptations and their impact on European foreign 
policy cooperation and European diplomacy. This paper aims to contribute to our understanding of the 
EU foreign policy system by looking at the legitimacy construction of the EEAS and its network of 
EU delegations1.  
The compromise agreed upon in the Constitutional Draft Treaty and adapted in the Lisbon Treaty was 
to strengthen the diplomatic toolkit of the European Union by establishing the European External 
Action Service and its network of EU delegations, while at the same time ensuring that the EEAS 
would not become a ‘traditional foreign service’ but would assist the High Representative and 
collaborate strongly with the diplomatic services of the member states, as also the quote above points 
out. The EEAS was thus meant to deliver an increase in efficacy for European diplomacy, without at 
the same time looking too much like a traditional diplomatic service that would stand in competition 
or even take over from member states. As a matter of fact, it was the state-like elements and 
designations that were removed in the process from Convention draft to Lisbon Treaty such as the title 
of Union Minister for Foreign Affairs for the EU High Representative. Most documents from the 
establishment period of the EEAS and the delegation system in 2009-10 focus on procedural and 
structural aspects, but they do not provide a clear task description and role definition of the new 
service. For EU delegations, it was clearly the majority view from the start that they would be 
subsumed under the EEAS and serve as its diplomatic network, but the overall task set was not 
determined. This lack of clear task descriptions, combined with a lack of vision from Brussels on their 
 
1 In analyzing the legitimacy construction of EU delegations, we focus on bilateral relations. Due to their 
specific nature and limited space, we are not able to consider the legitimacy of EU delegations in multilateral 
settings. For details on those see Laatikainen 2015;  
 3 
role and tasks on the ground in the first years after them turning into EU delegations also created space 
for bottom-up initiatives and a pragmatic fine-tuning between member states embassies and EU 
delegation staff.  
The European External Action Service (EEAS) and EU delegations have developed the mantra of ‘being 
of service to EU member states’ in EU foreign policy making as their unique selling point during the 
past years, as the empirics presented in this paper illustrate. The aim of the paper is to show how the 
EEAS and its delegation network sought to establish throughput legitimacy, but also reflect upon the 
question why the perception of being legitimate is a particular concern for the EEAS and its delegation 
network. We trace how the idea evolved into the preparations of the EEAS and its institutionalisation. 
In contrast to the legal analysis of the EEAS, we focus on the challenge of providing the new service 
with a viable degree of legitimacy. First, we discuss the distinct need of throughput legitimacy 
construction of the EEAS within the system of European foreign policy cooperation, and provide a short 
discussion on legitimacy as used in this special issue. We then trace the conflicting expectations of 
‘roles’ expressed during the Convention on the Future of Europe and the Lisbon Treaty and show how 
the EEAS and EU delegations responded to the practice and contestation of EU foreign policy during 
treaty implementation. Because the EEAS and EU delegations were discussed separately at the time, we 
are able to compare what impact different levels of role contestation have for the legitimacy of 
diplomatic bodies and how these differences also lead to different strategies for the construction of 
legitimacy in practice. In conclusion, we reflect what this particular process of creating throughput 
legitimacy for the EEAS and its diplomatic network shows us about the EU as a foreign policy actor. 
The process of legitimacy construction and acceptance of the EEAS and its delegation network show 
the boundaries, within which the EEAS and its delegations are situated and have to manoeuvre in the 
years to come.  
2. The relevance of understanding the EEAS legitimacy construction: the boundaries of 
political control 
First conceived as an administrative structure in the Convention on the Future of Europe in 2003-
2004, the EEAS was formally established by “Council decision of 26 July 2010 establishing the 
organisation and functioning of the European External Action Service” (Council of the European 
Union 2010). Its legal base was found in treaty provision on the High Representative of the Union for 
Foreign and Security Policy (Art 27(3) TEU), identifying its first line of responsibility as assisting the 
High Representative and working “in collaboration with the diplomatic services of the Member 
States” (Art. 27(3) TEU). The final elements of the provision define in very abstract ways the staffing 
sources as well as the process by which the service is to be established. Council decision 427/2010 is 
slightly more forthcoming as to the substantive tasks allotted to the EEAS, despite focusing largely on 
the administrative structures. It groups four specific tasks, three derived from the High Representatives 
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position, CFSP and CSDP, presidency tasks derived from the HR acting as chair of the Foreign Affairs 
Council, and tasks derived from the HR as Commissioner for external relations (Art. 2(1)). Its fourth 
task is named as providing support to other actors in the policy area of external relations (Art 2(2).  
The EU delegations are tasked in the Lisbon Treaty with representing the Union, places them under 
the authority of the HR/VP and foresees that they “shall act in close co-operation with Member States' 
diplomatic and consular missions”. The Council decision establishing the EEAS emphasizes that the 
delegations are an integral part of the EEAS (Art. 1(4)), and are meant to “share information with the 
diplomatic services of the Member States” (Art. 5(8)). Article 5 of this decision outlines some 
procedural aspects (e.g. line of instructions and personnel), but the role definition of the upgraded 
delegations is kept rather vague. The 2013 EEAS review acknowledges that “delegations in the field 
had to transform themselves overnight taking on new roles with no extra resources and without 
consolidated instructions or advice” (High Representative 2013). Yet, apart from this rather general 
mention, there were no detailed instructions or strategic plan of how the upgraded delegations should 
take up their new tasks, even after the EEAS had been officially established in December 2010. It is 
only since the EEAS review in summer 2013 that the European diplomatic representation in third 
countries has gained more attention with policy-makers in Brussels.  
Legitimacy within the broader EU debate is mostly viewed as an attribute that actors, institutions, or 
their decisions and actions have or have not. They are a legitimate institution because the treaty tells 
so. They are a legitimate actor (and thus not an institution) because certain powers and tasks have been 
delegated to them in a legal act. In public deliberations of EU affairs being a legitimate actor or 
pursuing a legitimate action is thus taken synonymous with having legal authority, i.e. that an article in 
the treaties provides the actor with the legal authority to take action in a certain area by applying 
certain procedures. When applying this perspective to the EEAS, we quickly see the difficulty with 
applying this generic understanding of legitimacy: the treaty does not really give the EEAS a defined 
role, but a generic one. At least at the beginning of the EEAS life, it is more “vessel” (i.e. dependent 
on what others pour in it) than that it provides substance and direction itself. Even before it began to 
act autonomously, stakeholders attempted to contain it. The turn from organisations having legitimacy 
to organisations (see e.g. Dowling and Pfeffer 1975) and their environment constructing legitimacy is 
also visible in the academic scholarship of organisational and cognitive studies as well as International 
Relations (Schmidt 2012, Rixen and Viola 2014).  
In our analysis of legitimacy construction, we consider four aspects: we take a constructivist approach 
to the source of legitimacy that emphasises that legitimacy is not a given quality, but is constructed by 
involved stakeholders. We investigate if this process of legitimacy construction is smooth or 
conflictual and if we see variations between the EEAS and the EU delegations. We also consider 
legitimacy towards whom, asking if the focus to gain legitimacy is mainly towards other Brussels-
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based actors, or what role national capitals and European citizens play. Last, we ask about the 
legitimacy construction to do what. The academic literature highlights three points that are relevant for 
our understanding of the EEAS positioning in the system of European foreign policy cooperation.  
First, it is relevant to consider if stakeholders consider an actor legitimate because of interest 
(cognitive legitimacy) or self-interest (pragmatic legitimacy). Hurd (1999: 386-7) suggests that 
stakeholders can have varying interests that will still lead to strong legitimacy construction. 
Legitimacy is only weak if it is based on self-interested calculation. Golant & Sillince (2007) take this 
point forward and suggest that there is too much focus on “pragmatic legitimacy” while the need for 
cognitive legitimacy (often termed as “moral legitimacy”) is underestimated. Cognitive legitimacy is 
not about self-interest and “assessment of means and ends” but rather about “outcome based on 
common understanding” (Golant & Sillince 2007: 1150). Cognitive legitimacy is needed, as the 
legitimacy construction of an organization is otherwise unstable and prone to conflict. The issue now 
is that “emerging organizations suffer from a cognitive legitimacy deficit.” (Golant & Sillince 2007: 
1050). This discussion provides us useful considerations for studying the legitimacy construction of 
the EEAS: we can assume that right at its start the EEAS did not have cognitive legitimacy, but was in 
need of creating one to being recognised beyond pragmatically legitimate. Being considered legitimate 
because it fits into the self-interest of the stakeholders (pragmatic legitimacy) is not sufficient in the 
long run. Internalisation is a key concept in this process of creating sustainable and stable legitimacy. 
Cognitive legitimacy is reached if an actor is accepted, even if in a particular case it goes against the 
self-interest of a particular stakeholder. To add to this distinction, we must also consider the less likely 
alternative that stakeholders simply did not care about the EEAS, which would mean that the EEAS 
did not hold any form of legitimacy to start with. 
Secondly, there is a conceptual difference between organizational legitimacy and organizational 
reputation. Deephouse and Carter (2005) show that isomorphism and (financial) performance relate 
differently to legitimacy and reputation. Isomorphism, according to Deephouse and Carter is 
positively related to legitimacy but has not the same effect on reputation. This implies for our study of 
EEAS legitimacy construction that legitimacy could be achieved through isomorphism, i.e. by ensure 
that the EEAS fulfils the role expectations of various actors and looks similar to those organizations 
that stakeholders have in mind. There are, however, two complications: first of all, as we will show 
below stakeholders did not agree and held varying, often contradicting expectations. If the EEAS 
behaves too much like any other diplomatic actor, some stakeholders might consider this against 
isomorphism, while other stakeholders might miss the differentiation aspect (i.e. no 29th foreign 
ministry but added value by bringing something to the table that national diplomatic services cannot 
achieve). If the EEAS, on the other hand, looks and behaves too little like a diplomatic actor but more 
like an EU agency, yet other stakeholders might find that it does not fulfil its role and thus the EEAS 
might lose in reputation and thus legitimacy.  
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Thirdly, a certain expectation of what the EEAS is shapes its legitimacy construction. Is it considered 
to be a diplomatic, political, or bureaucratic actor? At national level, we nowadays rarely question the 
existence of Ministries of Foreign Affairs and their diplomatic network. Even though their actions 
might be criticised,  foreign ministries are meant to design and implement foreign policy2. But how 
does the EEAS compare to those 28 foreign ministries? The EU delegations are meant to represent the 
European Union diplomatically abroad, but they are not meant to replace the diplomatic networks of 
the member states. Diplomatic roles are clearly defined for national embassies: to represent, to collect 
information and support understanding of local developments, to communicate and negotiate (Duquet 
2018). The distinction taken by this special issue between input, throughout and output legitimacy 
(reference to intro) provides us with the necessary tools to link the foreign policy and legitimacy 
discussion. The legitimacy construction of the EEAS relates in particular to the notion of through-put 
legitimacy in explaining “what goes on inside the ´black box´ of EU governance” (Schmidt 2013: p. 
5). Throughput legitimacy, as defined by Schmidt, is “process-orientated and based on the interactions 
of all actors engaged in EU governance” (Schmidt 2013: p. 5)3. Applying the notion of through-put 
legitimacy allows us to capture the particular nature of the EEAS and its EU delegations, i.e. that this 
system is meant to act as a facilitator of European foreign policy making within the hybrid foreign 
policy system of the European Union (Smith 2012, Smith 2018). This means that it does not fit the 
usual categorisations of foreign policy actors, and thus also not their way of gaining and retaining 
legitimacy. The EEAS is meant to support other foreign policy actors within this hybrid system of EU 
external relations, like the foreign ministries of EU member states and the European Commission DGs 
with external dossiers, but it is not meant to become a foreign ministry. At the same time, in situating 
the EEAS within the EU foreign policy system it is useful to remember that European foreign policy is 
“situated in a ´policy space´ where many of the boundaries are unclear” (Smith 2003: 558; for similar 
discussion on institutions not just shaped by intentional constitutional choice see Kohler-Koch 2000: 
514-515). Looking at the legitimacy construction allows us to show how the EEAS finds its place 
within the boundaries set-up by the treaty and its stakeholders.  
Understanding those processes of legitimacy construction of the EEAS and the delegation network is 
therefore allowing us to get a better insight in this process of political control within the EU foreign 
policy system. We get to better understand what different actors want the European diplomatic system 
 
2 The foreign ministries of EU member states increasingly experienced their role and spheres of influence being 
diminished when it comes to the relationship with other EU members. In many member states, offices of prime 
ministers or chancelleries have been taken over “EU affairs”, and also the role of embassies within the EU 
changed considerably. See Bátora & Hocking 2009. 
3 The last part of Schmidt´s definition of throughput legitimacy also refers to interaction with people, which does 
not fit in our case. We therefore focus on the dimension of throughput legitimacy, i.e. the ‘workings’ of the 
system, “efficacy, accountability and transparency of the EU’s governance processes”. 
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to be, i.e. what the boundaries are within which the EEAS and EU delegations can situate their role 
construction. 
3. The EEAS, EU delegations and the contested structures of European diplomacy 
During the discussion prior to setting-up the EEAS and the system of EU delegations, we can observe 
expressions of the vastly different expectations ranging between the conception of the EEAS as a ‘EU 
foreign ministry’ on the one hand and the EEAS acting as focal point improving the collaboration on 
specific policy areas in external relations/foreign policy on the other hand (Morgenstern-Pomorski 
2018). EU delegations’ immediate transition to fully-fledged EU delegations in early 2010 was made 
possible also because the creation of EU diplomatic representations encountered much less resistance 
during the debates of the Convention and later stages of institutional creation. Another item discussed 
repeatedly during the Convention, the creation of a diplomatic academy as part of the new set of 
structures was more frequently opposed in these debates, and consequently removed from the 
proposals. The low level of contestation for the delegation system does not mean that no opposition 
existed to the outcome: The Commission on a number of occasions challenged changes in the 
delegation system and attempted to retain direct control over its global network during the Convention 
(Morgenstern-Pomorski 2018: 95-99). Nevertheless, the vast majority of contributions during the 
Convention saw the creation of an EU delegation system, as opposed to a system of Commission 
delegations, as vital element of reforms. Despite this, in setting-up the EEAS as an organisation and 
the legal switch to a delegation system in 2009, reactivated some of the opposition that had lost out 
during the Convention. Most notably the British government expressed concern over the delegations’ 
role in speaking for the member states in international organisations and committed to “guarding 
vigilantly against competence creep” (Foreign and Commonwealth Office 2012). Overall, by 2009/10 
a diffuse and diverse set of expectations towards the EEAS and its delegation network existed across 
its stakeholders. In terms of support, it is interesting to note that the EEAS received strong support 
from its inception to its operation as a new EU body from an unusual foreign policy actor, the 
European Parliament (Morgenstern-Pomorski 2018; Raube 2012). 
The early years after the Lisbon Treaty show that the agreement of members’ states in the Lisbon 
Treaty and the Council decisions establishing the EEAS are vague on objectives and allow varies 
possible interpretations. Roles have at this point on purpose not been clearly defined to allow for an 
agreement between member states. In terms of the process of legitimacy construction, there is a clear 
difference observable at this point between the EEAS headquarters and the EU delegations. The 
delegation network is more generally viewed positively and as an asset to the EU and the member 
states. The delegations needed to be updated and take up new roles in foreign policy cooperation and 
in coordinating member states diplomats on the ground (Bicchi 2018;Maurer and Raik 2018, see also 
Austermann 2014). Yet, they had the advantage that they were there right from the start, after a re-
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designation to EU delegations with the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty. EU delegations had to re-
focus their activities to coordinate member states on the ground, inform member states´ diplomats and 
more generally to become the hub of European diplomatic cooperation abroad in third countries (for a 
comparison of what role EU delegations played before the Lisbon Treaty see Hill/Wallace 1979, 
Bruter 1999, or Carta 2005). The EEAS in the meantime had to be set-up in a laborious process that 
began with the negotiation of a Council decision in 2010 and continued in the years after. The first 
years of the EEAS in Brussels were thus rather focused on putting the new actor in place and shaping 
its role in the established foreign policy coordination arena in Brussels (pragmatic legitimacy), rather 
than having all attention and resources available to work on the construction of cognitive legitimacy.   
Once established and working, the EEAS and its delegation network aimed at establishing legitimacy 
through support from the Brussels actors as well as their stakeholders in the national capitals. They did 
so in the face of a discourse of “cost-efficiency” and “budget-neutrality” (Council Secretariat 2009, 
Wright 2013). As the defined role of the EEAS and its network is vague and legal provisions do not 
have the same weight in CFSP as they have in public policy-making, the roles exercised by the service 
and its delegations remain largely dependent on this interaction with stakeholders. When the EEAS 
was thought up as a support to the double-hatted ‘EU Foreign Minister’, it was designed by a much 
broader coalition of stakeholders than it would later co-operate with. The agreement found at the 
Convention was more than the lowest common denominator; it represented a majority of view of the 
Convention, and was founded on a vast number of issue linkages. But it was not necessarily a view of 
the Member States and not necessarily a view of the European Commission, the EEAS’ major internal 
stakeholders. As a consequence, when the EU foreign policy system was changed by these 
stakeholders, they sought to undermine central roles the service was thought up to fulfil. For the 
member states, this included a re-arrangement of chairing in Council (Vanhoonacker, Pomorska and 
Maurer 2011) and for the Commission, it meant an attempt to control the EEAS’ hold on the 
delegations through budgetary procedures and staffing (Morgenstern-Pomorski 2018).  
The role and exact working process of delegation network is not specified in the Treaty or EEAS 
decision. During the first three years, only very vague guidance on how the network should and could 
develop was forthcoming. Delegations had to gain legitimacy towards other EU actors on the ground, 
which depended very much on perspective, vision, and personality of the respective EU ambassador 
(Maurer & Raik 2018; Terzi 2018). In many locations, delegations attempted to develop legitimacy by   
“being of service” or providing some kind of “added value” to member states on the ground (Maurer 
and Raik 2018; Maurer 2015). In terms of legitimacy construction, it shows that the EU delegations´ 
attempts on the ground are very much targeted towards pragmatic legitimacy construction, i.e. to add 
value to member states in third countries by providing easier access to host government officials, 
providing information and synthesis, and an easy way to exchange with other EU member states (see 
also Maurer 2015). In the more regular third country settings, EU delegations found their expanded 
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role to be more smoothly accepted by member states´ diplomats in third countries (compared to 
Brussels). The level of acceptance depended in turn on the input of the EU ambassador, the 
personalities and EU experience of national diplomats involved, as well as third country factors 
(Bicchi & Maurer 2018). The recognition by the host country government and non-EU diplomats of 
the EU delegations further increased their legitimacy. Host governments see the added value of 
engaging with  28+1 at once, instead of having to contact all embassies and the EU Delegation 
separately. And the EU Delegation is an additional interlocutor next to the 28 member states to gain 
first-hand information about EU discussions. This creates an important link between throughput 
legitimacy and external legitimacy construction. The still scarce empirical material points out that host 
governments use the EU convening power often strategically: they look for it, if it is in their interest to 
have the EU support, they avoid it when the EU message might not be to their liking. This showed, for 
example, in the cases of Moscow and Washington (Maurer and Raik 2018), Turkey especially during 
the Gezi-park protests (Terzi 2018), or also in China (Austermann 2014).  
The positive assessment of the EU delegations’ efforts by most member states stakeholders on the 
ground is a good starting point for the construction of cognitive legitimacy, but delegations clearly 
struggle in constructing legitimacy in the centre of EU foreign policy cooperation: it took until the 
EEAS review in summer 2013 (High Representative 2013) that the European diplomatic 
representation in third countries have received more attention and first feedback on their efforts, and 
nowadays the contribution of the EEAS diplomatic network in terms of providing concise reporting 
directly to Brussels is considered a useful asset. Nevertheless, most difficult it is for the EU 
delegations to build pragmatic or cognitive legitimacy with member states capitals. For the EEAS and 
its delegations, it will not be possible to create such legitimacy by themselves, also considering that 
EU delegations did not receive any substantial increase in financial or human resources when taking 
over the role of coordinating the member states in third countries and representing the Union. 
Legitimacy construction is considered also a key task of an organisation’s leadership. In the early 
years, there was a lot of – often superficial but not less damaging for the EEAS legitimacy 
construction - criticism towards the HR/VP, or as Spence (2012: 123) summarizes diplomatically: 
“The EEAS’s 3,700 officials have not to date been firmly directed by a clear and coherent leadership 
to produce legitimacy for the new diplomatic arrangements”.  The new HR/VP has certainly 
performed better in promoting herself and the institution, but the performance towards member states 
is assessed more critically. Similar to the EU delegations, it is easier for the EEAS to construct 
legitimacy within the Brussels bubble, but for a sustainable and accepted role in the EU foreign policy 
system this acceptance would also need to extend to the foreign ministries in the capitals of the 
member states.  
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Another observation consistent with the EEAS headquarters is the support received by delegations 
from the members of the European Parliament. The European Parliament has been and continues to be 
very favourable to the workings of the delegation network.  While this may mostly be down to their 
appreciation of the resources of the delegations and the usefulness of their input for international 
visits, it is not clear whether a strong relationship with the EP will be sufficient to establish strong and 
long-lasting legitimacy for this organization.  
4. Conclusion 
The early years of the Lisbon Treaty showed that in European diplomacy the EEAS is not conceived as 
foreign ministry and the EU delegations while pursuing traditional diplomatic functions, have “service” 
towards other EU actors as central in their role construction. The literature confirms that pragmatic 
legitimacy (i.e. “being of service to member states” so they perceive an added-value) is a good starting 
point for a new actor, who does not have cognitive legitimacy yet. But, the literature also warns that an 
actor then has to attempt to gain cognitive legitimacy, which is more stable and not solely depending on 
interest calculation of stakeholders in a particular situation. This paper showed the difficulty that the 
EEAS and its delegation network have in constructing such cognitive legitimacy, in a foreign policy 
cooperation system where different stakeholders have different expectations and where their main 
contribution is defined by throughout legitimacy. The EEAS and its delegation in their very set-up are 
meant to facilitate European foreign policy making, but it is difficult for them to get their contribution 
recognised in this complex multi-venue and multi-actor system.  
Throughput legitimacy for the EEAS and the EU delegation system is not (yet) based on governance 
“with the people” as the concept has been recently adapted by Schmidt (2013). Rather, it reflects the 
traditional throughput in a sense that the system is legitimate when and where it interacts smoothly with 
the member states, the European Commission and the European Parliament, or in short where it governs 
‘with the stakeholders’. The difference in contestation during the moment of inception, in which the 
delegations were very quickly accepted in their expanded role appears to have made the take-over of 
tasks more immediate, but not in all instances less conflictual. Contestation of the legitimacy of the 
delegations occurred mainly in international organisation settings, where the right to speak for the EU 
and the member states have been challenged. In the more regular third country settings, EU delegations 
found their expanded role to be more smoothly accepted by member states, although the level of 
acceptance depended very much on the input of the EU ambassador, the personalities and EU experience 
of national diplomats involved, and third country factors. Also, in places of strong Commission presence 
(i.e. for external assistance management), the double-hatted role of the EU ambassador is key in setting 
a legitimate role of the EEAS staff next to their commission colleagues. The ‘service’ mind-set of 
delegations has played a crucial part, if not in creating this acceptance, then at least in cultivating it. The 
deferential approach may have created a legitimacy cushion for delegations to work with to expand their 
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activities, but it remains to be seen whether such an approach is capable of building robust legitimacy 
that may be needed in conflictual diplomatic situations where minority opposition may be encountered 
again. Also, in terms of resources EU delegations did not receive a considerable increase in financial or 
human resources. Otherwise delegations will remain trapped in a role environment dependent on 
unanimous acceptance by member states.  
Legitimacy of the EEAS and the delegation system did not arrive naturally in a state of legitimate action 
by treaty fiat. Instead, the contestation of these new actors continued beyond the decision to create them. 
This contestation in turn led both parts of the system, the EEAS and the delegations, to adopt a strongly 
deferential approach, focusing on a discourse set by member states of “budget neutrality” and “added 
value” in the case of the EEAS, and “being of service” mostly to member states, and the European 
Parliament, in the case of the delegations.  
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